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Abstract

In this paper, we study a two-stage model in which a manufacturer expands to a new
market through a local retailer and has private information on the advertising
effectiveness. The manufacturer chooses the information sharing format with the
retailer, either no information sharing or mandatory information sharing. Under no
information sharing format, the manufacturer and the retailer play a signaling game.
We derive both separating and pooling equilibria and conduct equilibrium refinements
for the signaling game. Under mandatory information sharing format, the manufacturer
simply informs the retailer the advertising effectiveness. We also establish the stylized
model and derive the optimal advertising effort. By comparing the manufacturer’s ex
ante profit under the two information sharing formats, we find that the manufacturer
always prefers mandatory information sharing, under which both the advertising effort
and profit can be higher. We also observe that unlike the common case that the channel
members may have different preference over the information sharing formats, the
manufacturer and the retailer can actually achieve alignment. While some previous
studies suggest that the manufacturer and the retailer may have different preference
over the information sharing formats, we find that they can actually achieve alignment
with asymmetric information on advertising effectiveness.

Keywords: advertising effectiveness, signaling game, asymmetric information,
information sharing
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1 Introduction
World merchandise exports have almost doubled from about US$10 trillion in 2005 to
US$ 19.67 trillion in 2018 (WTO 2019, UNCTAD 2019). With the significant growth
in global trade and an increasing number of affluent consumers in developing countries,
expanding and conducting business globally has become essential to many businesses.
When entering new markets overseas, companies usually seek partnership with local
distributors in order to minimize cost and risk, meet local regulatory requirements, and
benefit from local distributors’ unique expertise of their own markets (Arnold 2000).
Manufacturers often attempt to directly influence consumers’ purchase decisions
through the use of advertising to overcome differing objectives between the retailers
and themselves (Lal and Narasimhan 1996) and to achieve noteworthy brand successes
(Interbrand 2019). For example, Procter & Gamble (P&G) began its advertising
campaigns almost two years before entering China’s market (Riley 2013).
Meanwhile, large brand-owning manufacturers such as P&G, Unilever, and CocaCola, regularly conduct market research on demand and consumer preferences (Jiang
et al. 2016). For instance, in order to open the Russian market, P&G collaborated with
St. Petersburg University to gain a comprehensive understanding of the local market
and develop its advanced distribution system (Pepper 2012). Also, manufacturers can
have exclusive sales and predication experience in their home country. As a result, it is
not necessarily true that downstream retailers are better informed of market information
than upstream manufacturers, especially when products are introduced to a new market.
In fact, manufacturers can have better information about the factors that affect sales of
their own products (Gal-Or et al. 2008) as well as advertising effectiveness (Desai 2000).
Without such private information, retailers may react in a way that results in suboptimal
pricing and losing sales. Such supply chains operate in environments characterized by
escalating levels of information asymmetry in terms of demand, quality and cost
(Bakshi 2015, Li et al. 2017, Chod et al. 2019). However, very few studies have looked
into information asymmetry on advertising effectiveness in an emerging supply chain.
One remedy for this problem is information sharing between manufacturers and
retailers, as extensively reviewed in Chen (2003). Manufacturers can commit to sharing
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advertising information with the retailer. When such mandatory information sharing is
absent or perceived as unreliable by retailers, manufacturers can also signal favorable
information to their retailers by increasing wholesale price and/or advertising
expenditure (Chu 1992, Desai 2000, Ebrahim‐Khanjari 2012, Guo and Jiang 2016).
Thus, in this research, we ask the following questions: Shall the manufacturer
voluntarily and explicitly share its advertising effectiveness information with the
retailer? Moreover, if the manufacturer does choose no information sharing, then what
should be the manufacturer’s optimal signaling strategy? Regardless, what would be
the optimal wholesale price and advertising effort for the manufacturer?
To answer these questions, we consider a two-stage model for a manufacturer
expanding to a new market. The manufacturer will conduct advertising in the new
market and sell through a local retailer. Before entering the new market, the
manufacturer chooses an information sharing format and a wholesale price. After
expanding to the new market, the manufacturer can obtain private information about
advertising effectiveness by conducting investigations. The manufacturer then
determines the advertising effort under the pre-determined information sharing format.
Under no information sharing format, we study the signaling game between the
manufacturer and the retailer. We derive both pooling and separating equilibria on the
advertising effort and the conditions for their existences. We also conduct the
equilibrium refinement to derive the unique lexicographically maximum sequential
equilibrium. Under mandatory information sharing format, we solve the stylized game
model. We then investigate the manufacturer’s profit to determine the ex ante optimal
wholesale price under each information sharing format.
By comparing the manufacturer’s ex ante optimal profit under the two information
sharing formats, we find that the manufacturer always prefers the mandatory
information sharing. Previous literature indicates that when the manufacturer has
private information, the retailer prefers no information sharing because the
manufacturer’s downward distortion in the wholesale price endows the retailer a higher
profit margin. However, in our model, the private information is signaled through the
advertising effort, in which case the distortion also affects the market demand. Thus,
4

the retailer may also prefer mandatory information sharing, which signifies that the two
supply chain members can achieve alignment regarding the information sharing format.
We also find that the manufacturer’s advertising effort under no information sharing
format is no greater than that under mandatory information sharing format.
Subsequent sections are organized as follows. We review related literature in
Section 2. Section 3 provides the basic modeling framework and characterizes the
conditionally optimal advertising efforts and retail price. We then investigate the
manufacturer’s optimal strategy under no information in Section 4 and that under
mandatory information sharing in Section 5. Section 5 also compares the two
information sharing formats. Section 6 concludes our paper with a summary of our
findings, implications, and limitations.
2 Literature Review
Our research is related to two streams of literature: signaling under information
asymmetry, and supply chain management with advertising effort.
Signaling is a type of a dynamic Bayesian game that applies principle-agent theory,
and it arises when one player who owns private information takes effort to credibly
reveal the information to the player who lacks information. The most common private
information is market demand because a down-stream supply chain member, which is
closer to the market, is better informed of demand information than its upstream partner.
For example, Li et al. (2014) investigate supplier encroachment into a retailer’s market
where the retailer owns private information of market size and signals through order
quantities. They show that such information asymmetry will magnify double
marginalization. The supplier encroachment under information asymmetry is further
explored by considering risk attitude (by Li et al. 2017), production cost reduction (Sun
et al. 2019), and product quality (Zhang et al. 2019). Anand and Goyal (2009) consider
a supplier trading with two retailers, where one is an informed incumbent and the other
is an uninformed entrant. The incumbent, if acquires information, can then signal to the
supplier through order quantities, and the supplier then decides whether to leak the
information to the uninformed entrant. They show that because of the potential
5

information leakage by the supplier, the incumbent may prefer not to acquire
information even if it is costless. Yan et al. (2017) also investigate a model with one
supplier and two retailers with asymmetric information. Four sourcing strategies
corresponding to different moving sequences are investigated. They show that the
asymmetric retailers have misaligned preferences over the moving sequences. Li and
Zhou (2019) consider a horizontal supply chain with an integrated device manufacturer
that can source from a foundry or make its own production, where the demand
distribution is private information to the former. The capacity reservation equilibrium
decisions are derived and analyzed.
Besides market information, some studies also investigate signaling other types of
information. Bakshi et al. (2015) consider the case where the vendor has superior
knowledge of the product’s reliability, and such information is signaled through the
vendor’s after-sales service contracts. Guo and Jiang (2016) examine the impact of
consumers’ inequity aversion on a firm’s pricing and quality decisions when the firm
can signal information of cost efficiency to its consumers through both price and quality.
Jiang and Yang (2018) consider a two-period setting in which a firm signals private
information of cost and quality to early consumers through prices and later customers
can learn the product-quality information from the early customers. Chod et al. (2019)
consider a model in which the buyer has private information about its product quality
and suppliers face the risk of buyer default. Some studies also investigate the
information disclosure/acquisition/updating decisions, selling strategy choices under
asymmetric information settings; see, e.g., Dong et al. (2018), Li et al. (2018), Zhao
and Li (2018), Lai et al. (2019), Shen et al. (2019a, 2019b), Shi and Shen (2019). In
this work, we consider the case in which the manufacturer owns private information
about advertising effectiveness, where advertising effectiveness is defined as the effect
of advertising effort on product demand.
This research is also related to the studies on advertising efforts in a supply chain
setting. In this stream of literature, dynamic models are commonly adopted to
investigate the effect of advertising. For example, Xie and Wei (2009) consider
cooperative advertising by a retailer who advertises locally and a manufacturer who not
6

only advertises nationally but also pays a portion of the retailer’s local advertising cost.
By deriving the equilibrium pricing and advertising decisions under non-cooperative
and cooperative models, they demonstrated that cooperative advertising increases
overall advertising efforts by all channel members and reduces retailer prices. Zhang et
al. (2013) extend Xie and Wei’s (2009) model by considering the effects of advertising
on consumers’ goodwill and reference prices. Gou et al. (2014) investigate the model
in which advertising efforts can improve the firm’s goodwill and the market demand is
jointed determined by goodwill and advertising effort. Nair and Narasimhan (2006)
consider a dynamic model in which a firm’s goodwill is enabled by both advertising
and quality efforts. They show that the advertising effort rate decreases in goodwill
levels while quality effort rate increases in goodwill levels. Lu et al. (2016) study a joint
pricing and advertising problem in which sales price and advertising effort can
positively affect consumers’ reference price and hence demand. They concluded that
dynamic pricing and dynamic advertising strategies are strategic complements and
dominate the static strategy. Additionally, the length of the sales period plays a key role
in determining the superiority of the two dynamic strategies. Specifically, a relatively
short sales period highlights the value of the dynamic advertising while a long sales
period strengthens the function of dynamic pricing. In this study, we also investigate
the decisions on the advertising effort but in a static setting. In addition, different from
previous studies, we assume that advertising effectiveness is the manufacturer’s private
information, and we derive the manufacturer’s advertising effort equilibrium to signal
the advertising effectiveness to the retailer. Other studies regarding advertising include
Shen et al. (2019c), Chiu et al. (2018).
Our research is most closely related to Desai (2000) and Jiang et al. (2016). Desai
(2000) considers a supply chain in which a manufacturer intends to expand to the new
market through a retailer. The manufacturer has multiple private information about
demand and advertising effectiveness, and demand information is signaled via three
decision variables, namely wholesale prices, advertising costs, and slotting allowances.
While using the same channel structure as, we differentiate our paper from Desai (2000)
by obtaining both separating and pooling equilibria under one-dimensional private
7

information on the advertising effectiveness and by investigating the manufacturer’s ex
ante preference over information sharing formats.
Channel members’ preference over three information sharing formats (no sharing,
mandatory sharing, and voluntary sharing) has been discussed in Jiang et al. (2016).
They show that the manufacturer prefers no-sharing format and the retailer prefers
mandatory sharing. The impact of demand forecast accuracy and the risk attitude on
information-sharing preferences is also investigated. In this work, we examine both
mandatory information sharing and no information sharing. Our work differs from
Jiang et al.’s (2016) by considering the manufacturer’s advertising effort, in which the
advertising effectiveness is the private information of the manufacturer and also
indirectly affects the market demand. We show that, unlike the results in Jiang et al.
(2016), the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve ex ante preference alignment.
3 Model
Consider a supply chain consisting of one manufacturer (she) and one retailer (he),
where the manufacturer is the brand owner and wants to expand into a new market by
selling through the retailer. The manufacturer will take the effort to advertise her
products. Advertising is assumed to have a positive effect on the market demand (see,
for example, Gou et al. 2014, Desai 2000), and this effect on demand by a unit of
advertising effort is defined as advertising effectiveness. We let 𝑒 be the advertising
effort and 𝛽 be the advertising effectiveness. The advertising effectiveness can be
either high or low. Since the manufacturer undertakes the advertising expenditure, the
advertising effectiveness is her private information. Follow the common assumption in
signaling games (Anand and Goyal 2009, Jiang et al. 2014, 2016, Li et al. 2017, Zhang
et al. 2019), we adopt a two-pint distribution to characterize the information asymmetry.
Specifically, 𝛽 can be either a high value 𝛽ℎ with an ex ante probability of 𝛼 or a
low value 𝛽𝑙 with an ex ante probability of 1 − 𝛼, where 𝛽ℎ > 𝛽𝑙 > 0 and 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤
1. As discussed in the introduction section, we consider the case in which the brandowning manufacturer expands to the new market through the retailer, and only the
manufacturer has private information about the advertising effectiveness. The
8

manufacturer knows the exact value of advertising effectiveness 𝛽 but the retailer only
knows the prior distribution of 𝛽 . For ease of presentation, we denote 𝜃 = 𝛽ℎ /𝛽𝑙 ,
which characterizes the uncertainty of advertising effectiveness. A larger 𝜃 indicates
a higher uncertainty level of advertising effectiveness.

Figure 1. Event sequence

The event sequence is shown in Figure 1. Stage 1 is the pre-entry stage, where the
manufacturer first announces the information sharing format to the retailer. As
discussed in Jiang et al. (2016), we consider two information sharing formats: no
information sharing and mandatory information sharing. Under the no information
sharing format, the manufacturer ex ante commits not sharing any advertising
effectiveness information with the retailer, and under the mandatory information
sharing format, the manufacturer ex ante commits to sharing the true advertising
effectiveness information with the retailer. Besides the above two information sharing
formats, Jiang et al. (2016) also discuss voluntary information sharing, where the
manufacturer ex post decides whether to share the information after receiving it. As in
Jiang et al.’s (2016) risk-natural case, the 𝑙 -type manufacturer wants the retailer to
know its type (see the first paragraph of Section 4.1.1 for details) and thus chooses to
share information, and the ℎ -type manufacturer wants to hide its identity and thus
chooses not to share information. The retailer is also aware of it, so that in either case
the retailer can correctly infer the manufacturer type. The ℎ-type manufacturer is then
indifferent between sharing or not sharing. Thus, the voluntary information sharing will
lead to the same results as mandatory information sharing. Therefore, this paper focuses
on no information sharing and mandatory information sharing. For a given information
sharing format, the manufacturer then determines the wholesale price 𝑤. Note that it
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usually takes time for the manufacturer to conduct advertising before entering the new
market and that the manufacturer expands to the new market with well-developed
products. We assume the wholesale price is determined in Stage 1.
Then, the manufacturer enters the new market in Stage 2. At the beginning of stage
2, the nature chooses advertising effectiveness, 𝛽𝑖 , where 𝑖 = ℎ, 𝑙. The manufacturer
observes advertising effectiveness and determines the advertising effort 𝑒. The retailer
observes the advertising effort e, formulates his belief on the advertising effectiveness
type, say 𝛽𝑗 , where 𝑗 = ℎ, 𝑙, and chooses the retailing price 𝑝. Note that the retailer’s
belief may or may not be consistent with the true value. We assume the advertising
effort by the manufacturer is observable to the retailer because the retailer can infer
advertising effort from, for example, the publication frequency of videos and posters in
social media after the manufacturer conducts advertising.
The market demand is then realized. We assume that the market demand is
𝐷 = 𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑒,
where 𝑎 is the potential market size, 𝑏 is the price-sensitive parameter, and 𝛽𝑖 is the
true advertising effectiveness. This demand function is widely used in the existing
literature (see, for example, Dong et al. 2016, and Li 2018, Dong et al. 2019, Shi et al.
2020). We assume that the retailer places an order after demand realization so that there
is no demand uncertainty. We also assume that the advertisement with an advertising
effort 𝑒 costs the manufacturer 𝑘𝑒 2 , where 𝑘 > 0. The quadratic advertising cost is
also adopted by Zhang et al. (2013) and Lu et al. (2016). To rule out the trivial case that
the manufacturer chooses an infinity advertising effort level, we assume that 𝑘 >
𝛽𝐿 2 (𝛼𝜃 2 + 1 − 𝛼)/8𝑏. Without loss of generality, we normalize the unit production
cost of the product to be zero.
To solve this problem, we use backward induction. Given that the retailer’s belief
on advertising effectiveness is 𝛽𝑗 , he believes that the market demand would be 𝑎 −
𝑏𝑝 + 𝛽𝑗 𝑒 . Suppose 𝑤 is the wholesale price per unit. The retailer determines the
retailing price by maximizing (𝑝 − 𝑤)(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝 + 𝛽𝑗 𝑒) , which induces his optimal
retailing price 𝑝𝑗 (𝑒; 𝑤) =

𝑎+𝛽𝑗 𝑒+𝑏𝑤
2𝑏

. Expecting the optimal retailing price 𝑝𝑗 (𝑒; 𝑤)
10

as a function of 𝛽𝑗 and being aware of the true advertising effectiveness 𝛽𝑖 , the
𝑀
manufacturer’s profit, denote as Π𝑖𝑗
(𝑒; 𝑤), can be written as
𝑀(
Π𝑖𝑗
𝑒; 𝑤) = 𝑤 (𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑗 (𝑒; 𝑤) + 𝛽𝑖 𝑒) − 𝑘𝑒2 = 𝑤 [

𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2

𝛽𝑗

+ (𝛽𝑖 − ) 𝑒] − 𝑘𝑒2 .

(1)

2

𝑀
Hereafter, similar to the notation of Π𝑖𝑗
(𝑒; 𝑤), we use the first subscript “𝑖” to refer to

the true advertising effectiveness (i.e., 𝛽𝑖 ) and the second subscript “𝑗” to refer to the
retailer’s belief (i.e., 𝛽𝑗 ). We will also use superscripts “𝑀 ” and “𝑅 ” to denote the
manufacturer and the retailer, respectively.
The manufacturer determines the advertising effort 𝑒 by maximizing her profit
𝑀
Π𝑖𝑗
(𝑒; 𝑤) given by (1). Recall that the retailer’s best response retailing price is

𝑝𝑗 (𝑒; 𝑤) =

𝑎+𝛽𝑗 𝑒+𝑏𝑤
2𝑏

. We obtain the following proposition regarding the supply chain’s

conditionally optimal decisions and outcomes for any given 𝑤, 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛽𝑗 .
Proposition 1. Suppose that the true advertising effectiveness is 𝛽𝑖 , and the retailer’s
belief is 𝛽𝑗 . Given a wholesale price 𝑤, the manufacturer’s optimal advertising effort
is 𝑒𝑖𝑗 (𝑤) =

(2𝛽𝑖 −𝛽𝑗 )𝑤
4𝑘

, the retailer’s optimal price is 𝑝𝑗 (𝑤) =

4𝑘(𝑎+𝑏𝑤)+(2𝛽𝑖 −𝛽𝑗 )𝛽𝑗 𝑤
8𝑘𝑏

,

and the manufacturer and the retailer’s profits are
𝑀
Π𝑖𝑗
(𝑤)

=

(𝑎−𝑏𝑤)𝑤
2

2

+

(2𝛽𝑖 −𝛽𝑗 ) 𝑤 2
16𝑘

,

and
1

𝑅
Π𝑖𝑗
(𝑤) = 64𝑘 2 [4𝑘(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤) + (2𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑗 )𝛽𝑗 𝑤][4𝑘(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑤) + (2𝛽𝑖 − 𝛽𝑗 )(2𝛽𝑖 + 𝛽𝑗 )𝑤],

respectively.
Proposition 1 determines the conditionally optimal advertising effort and retail price
for any given wholesale price. In the following sections, we complete the determination
of the equilibria. Recall that the manufacturer chooses from two possible information
sharing formats at the beginning of stage 1. For each information format, we first use
backward analysis to derive the retailer’s optimal price, the manufacturer’s equilibrium
advertising effort, and the wholesale price decisions. Then, we discuss the
manufacturer’s preference over the two formats.
11

4 No information sharing
Under no information sharing format, the manufacturer does not share the advertising
effectiveness information to the retailer. Recall that the manufacturer determines the
advertising effort 𝑒 after observing the true advertising effectiveness. The advertising
effort 𝑒 will reflect the manufacturer’s observed information, and the retailer will use
the advertising effort 𝑒 to update his belief on advertising effectiveness. Since the
manufacturer can anticipate the retailer’s reaction to her advertising effort 𝑒, she may
purposely distort the advertising effort 𝑒 to induce the retailer to formulate a belief
that can benefit herself. Meanwhile, the retailer is also aware of the likelihood of
information distortion. Thus, a signaling game arises between the two supply chain
members. In this section, we first analyze the equilibrium of the signaling game
between the manufacture and the retailer in Section 4.1, and then we discuss the
manufacturer’s decision on the wholesale price given the equilibrium in Section 4.2.
4.1 The signaling game equilibrium
In a signaling game, two mutually exclusive types of equilibria might arise. The first is
a separating equilibrium, where the manufacturer varies her advertising effort decisions
based on advertising effectiveness, in which case the retailer can exactly infer the true
advertising effectiveness. The second is a pooling equilibrium, where the manufacturer
makes the same advertising effort decision no matter what the advertising effectiveness
is, in which case the retailer cannot update his belief on the advertising effectiveness.
We discuss these two types of equilibria in the following two subsections, respectively.
Recall that the wholesale price 𝑤 is given when the signaling game arises. Thus,
when we analyze the manufacturer’s signaling decision on the advertising effort 𝑒 in
this subsection, we omit the parameter 𝑤 from the notations for ease of presentation.
4.1.1 Separating
For any given advertising effort 𝑒, the manufacturer prefers the retailer to choose a low
retailing price so that the realized market demand is high. Recall that if the retailer’s
belief on the advertising effectiveness is 𝛽𝑗 , then his best response optimal price is
𝑝𝑗 (𝑒; 𝑤) =

𝑎+𝛽𝑗 𝑒+𝑏𝑤
2𝑏

. Recall also that 𝛽ℎ > 𝛽𝑙 > 0. Thus, if the manufacturer observes
12

a high advertising effectiveness 𝛽ℎ (hereafter referred to as the “ ℎ -type
manufacturer”), then she has the incentive to mimic that she observes low advertising
effectiveness (hereafter referred to as the “𝑙-type manufacturer”) so that the retailer can
set a low price. On the other hand, the 𝑙-type manufacturer has the incentive to separate
𝑀
from the ℎ-type manufacturer. This can easily verified by the relation that Πℎ𝑙
(𝑒) >
𝑀
𝑀
Πℎℎ
(𝑒) > Π𝑙𝑙𝑀 (𝑒) > Π𝑙ℎ
(𝑒) and 𝑒ℎ𝑙 > 𝑒ℎℎ > 𝑒𝑙𝑙 > 𝑒𝑙ℎ from (1). That is, for any given

advertising effort 𝑒, the ℎ-type manufacturer can obtain a higher profit by mimicking
the 𝑙 -type manufacturer; and the 𝑙 -type manufacturer will lose profit if being
perceived as an ℎ-type manufacturer. This is also illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. The manufacturer’s optimal profit functions

We use 𝛽𝑗(𝑒) to denote the updated belief of advertising effectiveness by the
retailer after observing the manufacturer’s advertising effort 𝑒. It is intuitive that the
manufacturer will invest more if the effort is high. Thus, we apply the following belief
structure with a threshold on the advertising effort 𝑒̂ 𝑠𝑒𝑝 ,
𝑗(𝑒) = {

𝑒 > 𝑒̂ 𝑠𝑒𝑝 ,
𝑒 ≤ 𝑒̂ 𝑠𝑒𝑝 .

ℎ,
𝑙,

Under this belief structure, the retailer believes that the advertising effectiveness is low
if and only if he observes that the manufacturer’s advertising effort is no more than the
threshold 𝑒̂ 𝑠𝑒𝑝 . To separate herself from the ℎ -type manufacturer, the 𝑙 -type
manufacturer has to distort down his advertising effort to the extent that the ℎ-type
manufacturer no longer wants to mimic, i.e., it is more profitable for the ℎ -type
13

manufacturer to set a high advertising effort than mimicking the 𝑙-type manufacturer’s
decision. By maximizing the manufacturer’s profit subject to the separating condition,
we have the following results.
Proposition 2. Under no information sharing, there exists a unique perfect Bayesian
separating equilibrium, where an 𝑙-type manufacturer chooses
𝑤

𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑝

= 𝑒̂ 𝑠𝑒𝑝 =

[(2𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) − √(3𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )] , 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 3,

{4𝑘
𝛽𝑙 𝑤
4𝑘

,

𝜃 > 3,
𝑠𝑒𝑝

and an ℎ-type manufacturer chooses 𝑒ℎ
Note that

𝛽𝑖 𝑤
4𝑘

=

𝛽ℎ 𝑤
4𝑘

> 𝑒̂ 𝑠𝑒𝑝 .

is the optimal advertising effort when there is no information

asymmetry between the supply chain members. Thus, from Proposition 2, if the
advertising effectiveness uncertainty is large enough, i.e., 𝜃 > 3 , then the 𝑙 -type
manufacturer can signal the true advertising effectiveness to the retailer without
distorting her advertising effort. This is known as costless separating. When the
advertising effectiveness uncertainty is not large, i.e., 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 3 ， the 𝑙 -type
manufacturer has to distort the advertising effort to convince the retailer that the true
advertising effectiveness is low. Specifically, it is easy to show that
𝛽𝑙 − [(2𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) − √(3𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )] = √𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ⋅ [√3𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 − √4(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 )] > 0,

where the last inequality holds because 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 3 (or, equivalently, 𝛽𝑙 < 𝛽ℎ ≤ 3𝛽𝑙 )
implies that (3𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ) > 4(𝛽ℎ − 𝛽𝑙 ). This signifies that if 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 3, then the 𝑙 type manufacturer has to distort down the advertising effort and hence fails to achieve
the maximum profit under symmetric information. The 𝑙-type manufacturer’s profit
lose due to distorting down the advertising effort is the signaling cost, and this is
referred to as costly separating.
4.1.2 Pooling
Proposition 2 shows that an 𝑙 -type manufacturer may distort down the advertising
effort 𝑒 and incur a signaling cost to separate herself from an ℎ-type manufacturer.
When the system parameters are such that the signaling cost is too high, i.e., the
downward distortion in the advertising effort is too large, the 𝑙-type manufacturer may
14

give up separating herself from the ℎ-type one, but sets a higher advertising effort to
pool with the ℎ-type manufacturer. The 𝑙-type manufacturer would prefer pooling if
pooling brings her a higher profit than costly separating from an ℎ-type manufacturer
does. For an ℎ-type manufacturer, the benefit of pretending to be an 𝑙-type is to induce
the retailer to set a low price to increase the realized demand, and the cost of mimicking
is decreasing in the realized demand due to the lowered advertising effort. If the 𝑙-type
manufacturer’s advertising effort is too low, the ℎ-type manufacturer will choose her
first-best advertising effort to separate herself. The two types of the manufacturer will
pool only if pooling can bring them higher profit than separating.
Since the ℎ-type manufacturer will separate herself if the advertising effort is too
low, we adopt the following pooling belief structure as used in Guo and Jiang (2016)
and Sun et al. (2019): There exists a threshold advertising effort 𝑒̂ 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 such that the
retailer’s belief on the investment effectiveness is 𝛽ℎ if he observes an advertising
effort 𝑒 > 𝑒̂ 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 and the retailer cannot update his belief if 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒̂ 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 . That is,
𝑒 > 𝑒̂ 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ,
𝑒 ≤ 𝑒̂ 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 .

ℎ,
𝑗(𝑒) = {
𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑏𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,

If the two types of manufacturers choose to pool at advertising effort 𝑒, the retailer
cannot update his belief on the advertising effectiveness so that his optimal retailing
price is determined by maximizing
(2)

𝑅 (𝑝,
𝑅 (𝑝,
Π𝑖𝑝
𝑒) = 𝛼Π𝑖ℎ
𝑒) + (1 − 𝛼)Π𝑖𝑙𝑅 (𝑝, 𝑒).

𝑅
𝑅
Here, we replace Π𝑖𝑗
with Π𝑖𝑝
to denote the retailer’s belief in the pooling case. One

can show that when facing a manufacturer with a pooling strategy, the retailer’s optimal
retailing price is
𝑝𝑝 (𝑒) =

𝑎+𝜇𝑒+𝑏𝑤
2𝑏

(3)

.

where 𝜇 = 𝛼𝛽ℎ + (1 − 𝛼)𝛽𝑙 is the ex ante expectation on the manufacturer’s
advertising effectiveness. Then, from (1), the 𝑖-type manufacturer’s profit is
𝑀 (𝑒)
Π𝑖𝑝
= 𝑤(𝑎 − 𝑏𝑝𝑝 (𝑒) + 𝛽𝑖 𝑒) − 𝑘𝑒 2 = 𝑤 [

𝑎−𝑏𝑤
2

𝜇

+ (𝛽𝑖 − 2 ) 𝑒] − 𝑘𝑒 2 .

(4)

To derive the pooling equilibrium, we maximize 𝑖-type manufacturer’s profit subject
to the condition that both types of the manufacturer being more profitable when they
15

2

𝛼 −2𝛼−3
choose pooling than separating. Let 𝜃̅(𝛼) = 𝛼2−4𝛼−1. Proposition 3 thus provides the

existence condition for a pooling equilibrium.
Proposition 3. If 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃̅(𝛼), then a perfect Bayesian pooling equilibrium exists
and the manufacturer will pool with an advertising effort 𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 = 𝑒̂ 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 =

(2𝛽𝑙 −𝜇)+ 𝑤
4𝑘

.

4.1.3 the LMSE equilibrium
From Propositions 2 and 3, a separating equilibrium (either costly separating or costless
separating) always exists while a pooling equilibrium only exists when 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃̅ (𝛼).
When there are multiple equilibria, we need to conduct the equilibrium refinement. One
commonly adopted refinement rule is the intuitive criterion. However, as discussed in
Mailath et al. (1993), the intuitive criterion may sometimes rule out pooling due to
logical incompleteness, and a lexicographically maximum sequential equilibrium
(LMSE) outcome is more plausible. Refining the equilibria by the LMSE concept in
signaling games is adopted in many recent works (e.g., Tian and Jiang 2016, Jiang et
al. 2016, Guo and Jiang 2016). In this work, we also adopt the LMSE concept, which
selects the most profitable outcome for the type that wants to reveal identity. In our
model, the 𝑙-type manufacturer has the incentive to reveal her identity and the ℎ-type
manufacturer wants to mimic. Thus, the LMSE refinements select the equilibrium that
is more profitable for the 𝑙-type manufacturer; that is, we compare Π𝑙𝑙𝑀 (𝑒𝑙𝑠𝑒𝑝 ) with
𝑀
(𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑜𝑙 ) and choose the larger one.
Π𝑙𝑝
𝛼
Let 𝜃̿(𝛼) =

4 +2𝛼 3+12𝛼 2+14𝛼−8√𝛼+2𝛼 2+𝛼 3 +3

. The unique LMSE is summarized in

𝛼 4 +14𝛼 2 +1

the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under no information sharing, a unique LMSE outcome exists.
Specifically, the manufacturer will pool if 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃̿(𝛼) and will separate if 𝜃 >
𝜃̿(𝛼).
Based on Propositions 2, 3 and 4, we depict the manufacturer’s LMSE in Figure
3, where the 𝑥-axis is the ex ante probability of the ℎ-type manufacturer 𝛼 and the y16

axis is the uncertainty on the advertising effectiveness 𝜃. Recall that 0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1 and
𝜃 > 1. The curves 𝜃 = 𝜃̅(𝛼) and 𝜃 = 𝜃̅ (𝛼), and the line 𝜃 = 3 divide the x-y plane
into four parts. If 1 < 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃̅ (𝛼), the manufacturer will pool, where both pooling and
separating equilibria exist but pooling is more profitable to the 𝑙-type manufacturer. If
𝜃̅ (𝛼) < 𝜃 ≤ 3, the manufacturer will conduct a costly separating. Specifically, when
𝜃̅(𝛼) < 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃̅ (𝛼), pooling equilibrium exists but is not as profitable as the separating
equilibrium for the 𝑙 -type manufacturer; and when 𝜃̅ (𝛼) < 𝜃 ≤ 3 , pooling
equilibrium no longer exists and separating is the unique equilibrium. If 𝜃 > 3, the
manufacturer attains a costless separating.

Figure 3. The LMSE under no information sharing.

4.2 Manufacturer’s ex ante wholesale price
In the previous subsection, we obtain the manufacturer’s ex post LMSE to signal
advertising effectiveness information. In this subsection, we determine the
manufacturer’s ex ante wholesale price given the LMSE.
Recall that the manufacturer has different LMSE depending on the relative
magnitude of the advertising effectiveness uncertainty level 𝜃 and the prior belief
structure 𝛼, as shown in Figure 3. We, therefore, analyze the manufacturer’s ex ante
wholesale price according to different values of 𝜃. The manufacturer’s expected ex
17

𝑀 (𝑤)]
ante profit is 𝐸𝑖 [ Π𝑖𝑗
where the retailer’s belief 𝑗 can either be “ 𝑖 ” with

separating equilibrium or be “𝑝” with pooling equilibrium, depending on the value of
the advertising effectiveness 𝜃. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Under no information sharing, the manufacturer’s optimal ex ante
wholesale price and optimal ex ante profit are
4𝑎𝑘
2 [1+2𝛼(𝜃−1)−3𝛼2

𝑤=

8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙
4𝑎𝑘

(𝜃−1)2 ]

,

𝑖𝑓 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃̿(𝛼),
𝑖𝑓 𝜃̿(𝛼) < 𝜃 ≤ 3 ,

,

8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 2 𝛾
4𝑎𝑘

{8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙2(𝛼𝜃 2+1−𝛼) ,

𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 3 ,

and
𝑎2 𝑘
8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙

Π𝑀 =

2 [1+2𝛼(−1+𝜃)−3𝛼 2

𝑎2 𝑘
8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 2 𝛾

{8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙

(𝛼𝜃 2 +1−𝛼)

, 𝑖𝑓 𝜃 ≤ 𝜃̿ (𝛼),
𝑖𝑓 𝜃̿(𝛼) < 𝜃 ≤ 3,

,

𝑎2 𝑘
2

(−1+𝜃)2]

,

𝑖𝑓 𝜃 > 3 ,

respectively, where
𝛾 = (8𝛼 − 7)𝜃 2 + 4(1 − 𝛼) [3𝜃 − 1 + (𝜃 − 1)√(3𝜃 − 1)(𝜃 − 1)].
Proposition 5 shows that the manufacturer’s optimal ex ante wholesale price has
three possible values, depending on whether the LMSE is costless separating, costly
separating, or pooling. We can show that the optimal wholesale price is piece wisely
increasing in 𝜃 but not monotonic in general, as shown in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The optimal ex ante wholesale price increases in 𝜃 over the intervals
(1, 𝜃̅ ], (𝜃̅ , 3], and [3, +∞), respectively.
Figure 4 depicts the optimal wholesale price in a numerical study. The blue solid
curve represents the optimal ex ante wholesale price under asymmetric information.
The dash-dotted red curve is the optimal ex ante wholesale price under symmetric
information in which case both the manufacturer and the retailer know the advertising
effectiveness. As depicted in Figure 4, the optimal wholesale price has jumps where the
LMSE changes. In addition, the wholesale price under asymmetric information can be
18

either higher or smaller than that under symmetric information.

Figure 4. The optimal wholesale price (𝑎 = 100, 𝑏 = 20, 𝛼 = 0.1, 𝑘 = 0.5)

Given the results in Proposition 5, we can summarize the supply chain members’
optimal decisions in Table 1.
Table 1. Optimal advertising effort and retail price under no information sharing
𝜃

𝑒∗

𝑝∗

𝑎 𝛽𝑙 (1+𝛼−𝛼𝜃)

2
𝑎{6𝑏𝑘+𝛼𝛽𝑙 (𝜃−1)[𝛼(𝜃−1)−1]}

𝛽𝑖

𝜃 ≤ 𝜃̿ (𝛼)

8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙

𝛽ℎ
𝜃̿(𝛼) < 𝜃 ≤ 3

𝛽𝑙
𝛽ℎ
𝜃>3

𝛽𝑙

2

[1+2𝛼(𝜃−1)−3𝛼2 (𝜃−1)2]
𝑎 𝛽𝑙 𝜃

2

𝑏{8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 [1+2𝛼(𝜃−1)−3𝛼2(𝜃−1)2 ]}
2

𝑎[12𝑏𝑘+𝛽𝑙 (𝜃2 −𝛾)]

2

2

8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 𝛾

2𝑏(8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 𝛾)

𝑎 𝛽𝑙 (2𝜃−1−√(𝜃−1)(3𝜃−1))

𝑎[12𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 (1+𝛾−2𝜃+√(𝜃−1)(3𝜃−1))]

8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 𝛾

2𝑏(8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 𝛾)

𝑎 𝛽𝑙 𝜃

𝑎[12𝑏𝑘+𝛽𝑙 (1−𝛼)(𝜃2 −1)]

2

8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙

2

8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙

2

2

2

2

(𝛼𝜃2 +1−𝛼)

2
2𝑏[8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 (𝛼𝜃2 +1−𝛼)]
2

𝑎 𝛽𝑙
(𝛼𝜃2 +1−𝛼)

𝑎[12𝑏𝑘−𝛼𝛽𝑙 (𝜃2 −1)]
2

2𝑏[8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 (𝛼𝜃2 +1−𝛼)]

5 Mandatory Information Sharing and Preference
In some practical situations, the manufacturer and retailer may develop a more
collaborative relationship in which case the manufacturer commits to sharing the
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information with the retailer, and the retailer makes the retailing price decision based
on the shared information. This case is known as mandatory information sharing (Jiang
et al. 2016). In this section, we consider investigating the supply chain members’
optimal decisions under mandatory information sharing in Section 5.1, and we compare
the manufacturer’s profit under no information sharing and under mandatory
information sharing in Section 5.2.
5.1 Mandatory information sharing
Under mandatory information sharing, the manufacturer will inform the retailer of the
true advertising effectiveness after observing this information. Thus, the retailer’s belief
is always identical to the true information, i.e., 𝛽𝑗 = 𝛽𝑖 . We use a tilde ( ̃ ) over a
variable to denote the mandatory information case.
Recall that Proposition 1 derives the optimal decisions when the true information
is 𝛽𝑖 and the retailer’s belief is 𝛽𝑗 without information sharing. By letting 𝑖 = 𝑗, the
results reduce to those in the mandatory information sharing case. Thus, we have the
following proposition.
Proposition 7. Consider the mandatory information sharing case. Given that the true
advertising effectiveness is 𝑖 ( 𝑖 = ℎ, 𝑙

and the wholesale price is 𝑤 , the

manufacturer’s advertising effort is 𝑒̃𝑖 (𝑤) =
is 𝑝̃𝑖 (𝑤) =
retailers

4𝑘(𝑎+𝑏𝑤)+𝛽𝑖2 𝑤
8𝑘𝑏

are

and the retailer’s optimal price

4𝑘

. Also, the corresponding profits of the manufacturer and the
2

̃ 𝑖𝑀 (𝑤) = (𝑎−𝑏𝑤)𝑤 + 𝛽𝑖 𝑤
Π

[4𝑘(𝑎−𝑏𝑤)+𝛽𝑖2 𝑤][4𝑘(𝑎−𝑏𝑤)+3𝛽𝑖2 𝑤]
64𝑘 2

𝛽𝑖 𝑤

2

2

16𝑘

and

̃ 𝑖𝑅 (𝑤) =
Π

, respectively.

Under mandatory information sharing, the manufacturer’s optimal wholesale price
can be derived by maximizing 𝐸𝑖 [ Π𝑖𝑖𝑀 (𝑤)] because the retailer is always informed
with the true advertising effectiveness information. We summarize the results in the
following proposition.
Proposition 8. Under mandatory information sharing, the manufacturer’s optimal ex
20

ante wholesale price and the profit are
𝑎2 𝑘
2

𝑤
̃=

4𝑎𝑘
8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 2 (𝛼𝜃 2 +1−𝛼)

̃𝑀 =
and Π

, respectively.

8𝑏𝑘−𝛽𝑙 (𝛼𝜃 2 +1−𝛼)

Notice from the comparison between Propositions 5 and 8 that the manufacturer’s
optimal ex ante wholesale price and the profit under no information sharing are the
same as those under mandatory information sharing, respectively, only when 𝜃 > 3. In
addition, w
̃ is also the optimal ex ante wholesale price under symmetric information,
as depicted in Figure 4.
5.2 Format preferences
We have obtained the supply chain members’ optimal decisions under both no
information sharing and mandatory information sharing. Note that the information
sharing format is chosen at the first stage before the manufacturer observes the true
information. Therefore, we can compare their ex ante profits to reveal the
manufacturer’s and the retailer’s preference over the two information sharing formats.
Recall that under no information sharing format, the manufacturer’s signaling
equilibrium depends on 𝜃 and 𝛼, and thus the manufacturer’s ex ante profit has three
possible values. Under mandatory information sharing, however, the manufacturer’s
optimal profit is unique. By comparing the profits under the two information sharing
formats, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 9. The manufacturer always prefers mandatory information sharing
̃ 𝑀 ≥ ΠM .
format, i.e., Π
Proposition 9 shows that the manufacturer’s ex ante profit under mandatory
information sharing is no less than that under no information sharing. This is because
the 𝑙 -type manufacturer under no information sharing has to distort down the
advertising effort to signal the information, which causes signaling cost. In Jiang et al.
(2016), where the manufacturer signals the market size information through the
wholesale price, the manufacturer also prefers mandatory information format because
of the signaling cost incurred under no information sharing format.
Jiang et al. (2016) also show that the retailer always prefers no information sharing
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than mandatory information sharing. This is because, under no information sharing
format, the manufacturer’s distorting down on the wholesale price endows the retailer
with a higher marginal profit and thus benefits the retailer. Therefore, the manufacturer
and the retailer have misalignment in the information sharing format. However, in our
model, we find that the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve alignment. We depict
̃ 𝑅 in Figure 5 through a numerical study. In this
the retailer’s ex ante profit Π𝑅 and Π
example, the manufacturer chooses to pool when 𝜃 ≤ 1.5 and achieves costless
separating when 𝜃 ≥ 3. We can see that in this numerical example, the retailer’s profit
under mandatory information sharing is weakly higher than that under no information
̃ R in an extensive numerical study by varying
sharing. In fact, we obtain Π R ≤ Π
̃ 𝑅 − Π 𝑅 prevents us from
system parameters. However, the complexity of Π
establishing the result theoretically.

̃ 𝑅 (𝑎 = 100, 𝑏 = 20, 𝛼 = 0.1, 𝑘 = 0.5)
Figure 5. Numerical comparison of Π 𝑅 and Π

The retailer’s preference in our model differs from Jiang et al.’s (2016) because the
manufacturer signals information through the advertising effort rather than the
wholesale price. When the manufacturer distorts down the wholesale price to signal
information as in Jiang et al. (2016), the retailer can benefit from the increased profit
margin. However, when the manufacturer distorts down the advertising effort to signal
22

information as in our case, the retailer will also suffer from the lowered advertising
effort because the advertising effort positively correlated with the market demand.
Therefore, when the manufacturer signals the advertising effectiveness through the
advertising effort, the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve aligned preference over
the information sharing format, i.e., mandatory information sharing.
We also compare the advertising efforts under the two information sharing formats
and obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 10. The manufacturer will invest less on the advertising effort under no
information sharing format than under the mandatory information sharing format; that
is, 𝑒 ≤ 𝑒̃ .
Proposition 10 shows that the manufacturer tends to invest less when the
manufacturer has to signal under no information sharing format than when she ex ante
commits to sharing the true information. This is because signal is costly for the
manufacturer so that the incentive to take advertising effort decreases.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we study a manufacturer’s choice of information sharing format with a
retailer, where the manufacturer expands to the new market through the retailer and has
private information on advertising effectiveness. Under no information sharing format,
we investigate both separating and pooling equilibria for the signaling game; and under
mandatory information sharing format, we derive the optimal solution through a
stylized model. The comparison of the manufacturer’s ex ante profit indicates that the
manufacturer always prefers mandatory information sharing, which turns out to be
consistent with the retailer’s preference by a numerical study. We also show that the
manufacturer’s advertising effort under no information sharing format is no greater than
that under the mandatory information sharing format.
In closing, we acknowledge the following limitations of our model. First, we only
consider static advertising decisions since we extend the study on advertising effort to
an asymmetric information setting. Future research can investigate the asymmetric
23

game model with dynamic advertising (e.g., Nair and Narasimhan 2006, Gou 2014) or
with a general distribution of information asymmetry (e.g., Li and Zhou 2019, Li and
Zhang 2008, Gal-Or et al. 2008). Second, we assume that there is no risk associated
with entering the new market. Therefore, considering international business risks such
as gray market and buyer default or incorporating supply chain members’ risk attitude
(e.g., Choi et al. 2016, Ma et al. 2019) can be another possible extension.

Acknowledgement
This research was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of
China under the grant no. 71871052, 71832001, the Fundamental Research Funds for
the Central Universities and DHU Distinguished Young Professor Program.
References
Anand, K. S., & Goyal, M. (2009). Strategic information management under leakage in a supply
chain. Management Science, 55(3), 438-452.
Arnold, D. (2000). Seven rules of international distribution. Harvard Business Review, 78(6),
131-137.
Bakshi, N., Kim, S. H., & Savva, N. (2015). Signaling new product reliability with after-sales
service contracts. Management Science, 61(8), 1812-1829.
Chen, F. (2003). Information sharing and supply chain coordination. Handbooks in operations
research and management science, 11, 341-421.
Chiu, C.H., Choi, T.M., Dai, X., Shen, B., Zheng, J. (2018). Optimal Advertising Budget Allocation
in Luxury Fashion Markets with Social Influences. Production and Operations Management. 27(8),
1611-1629.

Chod, J., Trichakis, N., & Tsoukalas, G. (2019). Supplier diversification under buyer
risk. Management Science, 65 (7), 2947-3448.
Choi, T. M., Wang, M., & Yue, X. (2016). Emerging production optimization issues in supply
chain systems. Annals of operations research, 240(2), 381-393.
Desai, P. S. (2000). Multiple messages to retain retailers: Signaling new product
demand. Marketing Science, 19(4), 381-389.
Dong, C., Liu, Q., & Shen, B. (2019). To be or not to be green? Strategic investment for green
product development in a supply chain. Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and
Transportation Review, 131, 193-227.
24

Dong, C., Shen, B., Chow, P. S., Yang, L., & Ng, C. T. (2016). Sustainability investment under
cap-and-trade regulation. Annals of Operations Research, 240(2), 509–531.
Dong, C., Yang, Y., & Zhao, M. (2018). Dynamic selling strategy for a firm under asymmetric
information: Direct selling vs. agent selling. International Journal of Production
Economics, 204, 204-213.
Ebrahim‐Khanjari, N., Hopp, W., & Iravani, S. M. (2012). Trust and information sharing in
supply chains. Production and Operations Management, 21(3), 444-464.
Gal-Or, E., Geylani, T., & Dukes, A. J. (2008). Information sharing in a channel with partially
informed retailers. Marketing Science, 27(4), 642-658.
Guo, X., & Jiang, B. (2016). Signaling through price and quality to consumers with fairness
concerns. Journal of Marketing Research, 53(6), 988-1000.
Gou, Q., Zhang, J., Liang, L., Huang, Z., & Ashley, A. (2014). Horizontal cooperative
programmes and cooperative advertising. International Journal of Production Research, 52(3),
691-712.
Interband. (2019). Best global brands 2019: Iconic moves transforming customer expectations.
Available at: https://www.interbrand.com/best-brands/best-global-brands/2019/.
Jiang, B., & Yang, B. (2018). Quality and pricing decisions in a market with consumer
information sharing. Management Science, 65(1), 272-285.
Jiang, B., Tian, L., Xu, Y., & Zhang, F. (2016). To share or not to share: Demand forecast sharing
in a distribution channel. Marketing Science, 35(5), 800-809.
Lai, X., Tao, Y., Wang, F., & Zou, Z. (2019). Sustainability investment in maritime supply chain
with risk behavior and information sharing. International Journal of Production
Economics, 218, 16-29.
Lal, R., & Narasimhan, C. (1996). The inverse relationship between manufacturer and retailer
margins: A theory. Marketing Science, 15(2), 132-151.
Li, L., and Zhang, H. (2008). Confidentiality and information sharing in supply chain
coordination. Management Science, 54(8), 1467-1481.
Li, G., Zheng, H., Sethi, S. P., & Guan, X. (2018). Inducing downstream information sharing
via manufacturer information acquisition and retailer subsidy. Decision Sciences, forthcoming.
Li, Q. (2018). The optimal multi-period modular design with fairness concerns. International
Journal of Production Economics 206, 233-249.
Li, Q., Li, B., Chen, P., & Hou, P. (2017). Dual-channel supply chain decisions under
asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer. Annals of Operations Research, 257(1-2),
423-447.
Li, Q., & Zhou, J. (2019). A horizontal capacity reservation game under asymmetric
information. International Journal of Production Research, 57(4), 1103-1118.
25

Li, Z., Gilbert, S. M., & Lai, G. (2014). Supplier encroachment under asymmetric information.
Management science, 60(2), 449-462.
Lu, L., Gou, Q., Tang, W., & Zhang, J. (2016). Joint pricing and advertising strategy with
reference price effect. International Journal of Production Research, 54(17), 5250-5270.
Ma, S., Li, G., Sethi, S. P., & Zhao, X. (2019). Advance selling in the presence of market power
and risk‐averse consumers. Decision Sciences, 50(1), 142-169.
Mailath, G. J., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., & Postlewaite, A. (1993). Belief-based refinements in
signalling games. Journal of Economic Theory, 60(2), 241-276.
Nair, A., & Narasimhan, R. (2006). Dynamics of competing with quality-and advertising-based
goodwill. European Journal of Operational Research, 175(1), 462-474.
Pepper, J. (2012). Russian tide: Building a leadership business in the midst of unprecedented
change. Cincinnati, OH: John Pepper.
Riley, Jim. (2013). How Did P&G Reach the Top in China? Available at
https://www.tutor2u.net/business/blog/how-did-pg-reach-the-top-in-china.
Shen, B., Choi T.M., & Chan, H.L. (2019a). Selling Green First or Not? A Bayesian Analysis
with Service Levels and Environmental Impact Considerations in the Big Data
Era. Technological Forecasting and Social Change. 144, 412-420.
Shen, B., Choi, T.M., & Minner, S. (2019b). A Review on Supply Chain Contracting with
Information Considerations: Information Updating and Information Asymmetry. International
Journal of Production Research. 57(15-16), 4898-4936.
Shen, B., Liu, S., Zhang, T., & Choi, T.M. (2019c). Optimal Advertising and Pricing for New
Green Products in the Circular Economy. Journal of Cleaner Production. 233, 314-327.
Shi, X., Chan, H.L., & Dong, C. (2020). Value of Bargaining Contract in a Supply Chain System
With Sustainability Investment: An Incentive Analysis. IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man,
and Cybernetics: Systems. 50(4): 1622-1634.
Sun, X., Tang, W., Chen, J., Li, S., & Zhang, J. (2019). Manufacturer encroachment with
production cost reduction under asymmetric information. Transportation Research Part E:
Logistics and Transportation Review, 128, 191-211.
Tian, L., & Jiang, B. (2017) Comment on “Strategic Information Management Under Leakage
in a Supply Chain”. Management Science, 63(12), 4258-4260.
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development). (2019). Key statistics and
trends in international trade 2018: International trade rebounds. Available at
https://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/ditctab2019d2_en.pdf.

WTO (World Trade Organization). (2019) World Trade Statistical Review 2019: Highlights of
world
trade.
Available
at
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/wts2019_e/wts2019chapter02_e.pdf.
Xie, J., & Wei, J. C. (2009). Coordinating advertising and pricing in a manufacturer–retailer
26

channel. European Journal of Operational Research, 197(2), 785-791.
Yan, Y., Zhao, R., & Lan, Y. (2017). Asymmetric retailers with different moving sequences:
Group buying vs. individual purchasing. European Journal of Operational Research, 261(3),
903-917.
Zhang, J., Gou, Q., Liang, L., & Huang, Z. (2013). Supply chain coordination through
cooperative advertising with reference price effect. Omega, 41(2), 345-353.
Zhang, J., Li, S., Zhang, S., & Dai, R. (2019). Manufacturer encroachment with quality decision
under asymmetric demand information. European Journal of Operational Research, 273(1),
217-236.
Zhao, D., & Li, Z. (2018). The impact of manufacturer’s encroachment and nonlinear
production cost on retailer’s information sharing decisions. Annals of Operations
Research, 264(1-2), 499-539.

27

